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Acknowledging required adjustments

The manager's favored three-at-the-back system doesn't represent the fundamental issue of Manchester United's difficulties. The Manchester giants are bouncing back from years of poor stewardship and the current squad remains in transition, displaying quality in particular roles while glaring deficiencies remain elsewhere.

That said, tactical weaknesses characterize Amorim's preferred formation, most notably numerical disadvantages in the middle and flank vulnerabilities that demand solutions. Previous managers have successfully managed similar challenges – the former Chelsea boss in West London and the Austrian coach with the Eagles prove that positional flexibility matters more than initial formations.

The manager recently commented: "The system isn't the problem, the results are," comparable to blaming symptoms rather than causes. Competitors have consistently exploited similar flaws in Amorim's approach for almost twelve months, not due to player misunderstanding but as the tactical plan itself contains inherent flaws.

As a result, supporters cannot anticipate an instant solution where everything falls into place, just as expensive signings will not instantly resolve the fundamental problems. The Bees' latest display acts as a perfect example – despite losing their manager and important squad members during the break, they modified their formation intentionally to expose United's predictable approach.

When the former Ajax coach arrived at Old Trafford, it quickly emerged that Dutch league achievements wouldn't translate to the Premier League; his inability to adjust was fundamental in his ultimate failure. Presently United's coach – who looks to have every required attribute for management's greatest challenge apart from adaptability – is repeating the same pattern and wasting a golden opportunity. Following generations the club has leadership committed to winning trophies rather than commercial interests.

Adjusting the outside centre-backs

Wide central defenders serve important purposes in United's formation: they carry possession forward, perform defensive interventions, cover wide areas, switch play, start offensive moves and augment forward play. Any tactical analyst could question whether deploying two of such versatile players in a three-man defense seems reasonable when a back four could address midfield shortages.

At the moment, these centre-backs find themselves restricted by opposing attackers who, via basic movement, prevent them from advancing into midfield as the system requires. This situation enables teams with numerical superiority to play around United's midfield, creating urgent problems that need addressing.

Potential fixes include directing defenders to push forward anyway – though this risks vulnerability at the back – or pulling Cunha deeper to enhance ball progression, reducing offensive output but benefiting from his progression. The smartest modification involves modifying the defensive approach from the current aggressive setup to a more balanced 4-4-2 that provides better coverage and avoids the necessity for defenders to advance.

Bringing back the young midfielder

Amorim's preferred style of impatient attacking forces the team to empty central areas and rely on long balls, hoping for magical moments rather than structured attacking patterns. While statistical metrics indicate potential, match observations reveal that present attacking output stem largely from fouls in the box and speculative attempts rather than sustained pressure.

Successful sides dominate games through tempo manipulation. United's inability to accomplish this doesn't fall solely on Amorim's approach; reports indicate he sought central additions during the offseason but faced opposition from management hierarchy. Regardless of blame, the present circumstance proves unworkable.

The manager's first-choice pairing of Casemiro and Bruno Fernandes, with Manuel Ugarte providing cover, has restricted chances for Kobbie Mainoo. Despite valid reservations exist about his athletic maturity and attacking contribution, marginalizing this ability creates doubts about the system's effectiveness.

Casemiro, Fernandes and Ugarte embody rapid transitions, whereas Mainoo offers pace management. During his Portuguese tenure, his side could play direct football due to technical advantage against Portuguese league defenses, knowing they could recover possession if they lost it. But in English football, the standard throughout means poor retention faces quick consequences, while pure power exclusively won't secure results.

The youngster's ball mastery impresses observers, and while partnering him with Fernandes creates defensive concerns, such deficiencies prove less important in a possession-dominant team. Given United's defensive record showing they surrender superior scoring situations than all competitors, including the youngster appears reasonable to try as other solutions have already failed. While uncertainty remains about his specific function in this system, match experience represents the ideal improvement method and would unlikely deteriorate existing circumstances.

Improving wing effectiveness

In right-sided positions, the partnership of Amad Diallo and Bryan Mbeumo should theoretically work given their shared attributes of imagination, understanding and grit. When combined with Leny Yoro, they could form a dangerous triangle that improves creative output. Right now however, static movement makes them easy to defend for prepared opponents.

The manager needs to introduce structured rotation patterns that generate confusion through regular movement. Ball distribution need to demonstrate variety – avoiding stationary reception but often into space to optimize forward movement. This method enables inward movement, eliminating markers and generating opportunities for attempts on goal or deliveries.

Down the left side, the full-back frequently receives possession in advanced areas although missing the technical refinement to exploit successfully. Adjusting his positioning somewhat further back would utilize his defensive ability and driving runs to {supply more creative players|service better attackers|provide for